Precaution and its impact on jurisprudential issues

Abstract

This research aims to discuss precaution as one of the sources that jurists resort to in order to derive legal rulings, either directly or indirectly. It discusses the impact of this principle and its influence on jurists in a number of legal issues, and reveals its place within the fundamental rules, distinguishing between legitimate precaution and reprehensible strictness. The research relied on the inductive method in tracing the statements of fundamentalists and jurists, and the analytical and comparative method in studying the impact of precaution on differences in jurisprudential rulings. It also addressed selected practical examples from various jurisprudential topics. The research concluded that precaution is not an independent proof in itself, but rather a jurisprudential approach governed by the objectives and general rules of Sharia, and that its legitimacy is contingent upon achieving the public interest and removing hardship, not causing hardship or restriction on those responsible.